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Using the machine learning approach known as reservoir computing, it is possible to train one
dynamical system to emulate another. We show that such trained reservoir computers reproduce the
properties of the attractor of the chaotic system sufficiently well to exhibit chaos synchronisation.
That is, the trained reservoir computer, weakly driven by the chaotic system, will synchronise with
the chaotic system. Conversely, the chaotic system, weakly driven by a trained reservoir computer,
will synchronise with the reservoir computer. We illustrate this behaviour on the Mackey-Glass and
Lorenz systems. We then show that trained reservoir computers can be used to crack chaos based
cryptography and illustrate this on a chaos cryptosystem based on the Mackey-Glass system. We
conclude by discussing why reservoir computers are so good at emulating chaotic systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can one train a nonlinear dynamical system to emu-
late a different nonlinear chaotic dynamical system? This
question has been answered positively in [1–5] in the con-
text of the machine learning technique known as reservoir
computing. But much remains to be learned concerning
the quality of this emulation.
Reservoir Computing (RC) [1, 6–8], on which this ap-
proach is based, is a machine learning technique in which
a nonlinear dynamical system with a large number of in-
ternal nodes (called the reservoir) is driven by a time
dependent signal. The connections between the inter-
nal variables are chosen at random and then kept fixed
(except, possibly, for a few global parameters that may
be adjusted). In many implementations, the reservoir is
a recurrent neural network with fixed connections. The
output of the reservoir computer is a single node whose
state is given by a linear combination of the states of the
internal variables. The weights of this linear combina-
tion are trained to match the output as closely as pos-
sible to a desired target. Although conceptually simple,
reservoir computing is powerful enough to equal other
algorithms on hard tasks such as channel equalisation,
phoneme recognition, and others (see [9, 10] for reviews).
The theory of reservoir computing is not very advanced
(the situation being similar to many machine learning
approaches which work well in practice but lack formal
explanations for their performance). One of the most
useful theoretical concepts is that of the linear and non-
linear memory capacity of reservoirs, see [11–14]. It was
also shown recently that a variant of reservoir computer
is universal in the category of fading memory filters [15].
Reservoir computing has also been implemented exper-
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imentally with performance comparable to digital imple-
mentations [16–18] with photonic implementations pre-
senting particularly high speeds [19–21], see [22] for a
review.
In the case where one wants the reservoir computer to
emulate a dynamical system, the reservoir is first driven
by the state of the dynamical system, and trained to pre-
dict this state one timestep in the future. After training
one closes the loop and feeds the output of the reservoir
back into itself, whereupon it will develop autonomous
dynamics that are – one hopes – close to those of the
original dynamical system.
This approach was originally introduced to forecast
the trajectories of chaotic dynamical systems, where it
reached record forecasting horizons [1]. These results
were improved recently in [15]. In addition this method
was used numerically in [3] to infer the values of hid-
den degrees of freedom of the dynamical system, in [4]
to estimate its Lyapunov exponents, and in [5] to pre-
dict spatio-temporal chaos. It was also implemented in
an opto-electronic system [2] where it was shown that
the experimental reservoir could be trained to have sim-
ilar dynamics to the original system (similar spectrum,
Lyapunov exponents, etc). From these works it is clear
that a reservoir computer trained as described above can
emulate another, a priori completely different (possibly
chaotic) dynamical system. However much remains to
be understood about the quality and accuracy of the
method, as well as its potential limitations. Here we
show how trained reservoir computers can be used to re-
place dynamical systems in two other applications: chaos
synchronisation and cracking chaos-based cryptography.
One of the most surprising aspects of chaos theory is
the synchronisation of two identical chaotic systems. Al-
though the dynamics of each system separately is unpre-
dictable, if one system is driven by the other, the two
systems will synchronise [23, 24]. This phenomenon has
been extensively studied, see e.g. the review [25].
In the first part of this work, we show that a reser-
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2voir computer, trained to emulate a chaotic system as
described above, if driven by the original system, will
synchronise with it. This demonstrates that not only is
the dynamics of the reservoir computer emulator super-
ficially similar to that of the original system, but that its
chaotic attractor has similar properties. That is, it cap-
tures a large part of the characteristics of the dynamics of
the original system. We illustrate this on two examples,
the Lorenz [26] and Mackey-Glass systems [27].
After the discovery of chaos synchronisation, consider-
able effort was devoted to trying to use this effect and the
unpredictability of chaotic systems to hide secret mes-
sages, see e.g. [28–30]. A series of experimental demon-
strations were realised [31–33]. However, it was later
shown that chaos-based cryptography is fundamentally
insecure, as there are efficient ways for an eavesdropper
to find the parameters of the chaotic system (which play
the role of secret key), at least using plain text attack.
This was first demonstrated on a series of examples, see
e.g. [34–40], and then in full generality [41].
As an application of our results on chaos synchroni-
sation we consider using the reservoir computer to crack
chaos-based cryptography. We will study a cryptosystem
based on the Mack-Glass equations previously studied
from the point of view of encryption and cryptanalysis
in [34, 40]. This is an ”open loop” configuration of the
type widely used in experiments because of its robust-
ness. Our attack based on reservoir computing performs
similarly to the parameter search studied in [34].
We conclude this article with a general discussion of
why reservoir computers are able to crack chaos-based
cryptosystems. This should be viewed as a general dis-
cussion which shows the plausibility of this kind of at-
tack, but without any claim to mathematical rigour or
an understanding of the efficiency of such attacks.
II. RESERVOIR COMPUTING
A. Basic principles
The reservoir computer used in this work is a discrete-
time echo state network, as introduced in [1, 6]. The
reservoir states vector x, consisting of N neurons, is up-
dated following the equation
x(n) = (1− Ca)x(n− 1)
+ C tanh (winu(n) +Wx(n− 1) + wbackd(n− 1)) ,
(1)
where n ∈ Z is the discrete time, C is a timescale con-
stant, a is the leak rate, W is a N ×N matrix of internal
connection weights, wback isN -size weight vector for feed-
back connections from the output to the reservoir and win
is a N -size vector and u is a constant. Together, C and
a realise a low-pass filter with adjustable properties.
The elements of win, W and wback are chosen from a
uniform distribution over the interval [−1,+1]. A reser-
voir computer must be not too far from the edge of chaos
to exhibit good performance. To this end the matrix W
is then rescaled to adapt its spectral radius. The vec-
tors win and wback are possibly also rescaled to adapt
the strength of the input and feedback. Throughout
this work the input bias is fixed to u = 0.2. To fix the
other parameters of the reservoir computer, such as C,
a, spectral radius of W , scaling of win and wback we took
inspiration from [6]. When the parameter values were
not available for a specific task, suitable values were cho-
sen heuristically, but without carrying out a systematic
search over all possible values. The chosen values of pa-
rameters are given in the text below.
The output equation of a single-output network is
given by a dot product
y(n) = wout [x(n), u(n)] , (2)
where [x(n), u(n)] is the concatenation of the reservoir
states vector x(n) with the input u(n), and wout are N+1
output weights (also known as the output mask).
During training we adjust the weights wout so that the
output y(n) is as close as possible to the desired output
y˜(n). To this end we minimise the Normalised Mean
Square Error (NMSE), given by
NMSE =
〈
(y(n)− y˜(n))2
〉
〈
(y˜(n)− 〈y˜(n)〉)2
〉 . (3)
The NMSE indicates how far the time series y(n) gen-
erated by the reservoir deviates from the target time se-
ries y˜(n). The resulting value is straightforward to in-
terpret: NMSE = 0 means that the two series match,
while NMSE = 1 indicates no similarity at all. Minimis-
ing the NMSE with respect to the readout weights gives
rise to a system of linear equations that is readily solved.
We do not use ridge regression [42] (except in the Lorenz
task, see below) as there is enough training data to avoid
overfitting.
After training we evaluate the performance of the
reservoir on a new data set. When we report NMSE
values, it is the values evaluated on the test sequence.
In the present work, the reservoir computer must pre-
dict or process continuous time signals u(t). To pass from
continuous to discrete time, we sample the continuous
time input as
u(n) = u(t+ n∆) (4)
where ∆ is the sampling interval. For the different ap-
plications, we quote the sampling interval used.
B. Training to crack chaotic cryptography
When training to crack chaotic cryptography, we op-
erate the reservoir as described above. We set wback = 0.
We consider a plain text attack in which Eve has access
to the signal sent by Alice to Bob, and to the message
3that we encrypted by Alice. For training we take u(n) to
be the signal intercepted by Eve. We take y˜(n) = m(n)
to be the message encoded by Alice. During the train-
ing phase the weights wout are thus adjusted so that the
reservoir outputs the encrypted message. Eve’s reservoir
computer is then ready to decrypt new encrypted mes-
sages.
C. Training to emulate chaotic systems
When training the reservoir to emulate a chaotic sys-
tem, for instance, for chaos synchronisation, we proceed
as follows. Denote by s(n) the time series of the chaotic
system we wish to emulate.
We set the input to a constant
u(n) = 0.2. (5)
During training Eqs. 1, 2, 3, 5 are supplemented by
d(n) = s(n) (during training),
y˜(n) = s(n) (during training). (6)
That is, the training phase is used to optimise the readout
weights wout so that the reservoir predicts the next point
s(n) in the input chaotic time series, given the previous
points s(n− 1), s(n− 2), ....
After the training, the readout weights wout are fixed
and the teacher signal d(n) is replaced by the output
signal y(n), so that the reservoir becomes autonomous.
The evolution of the reservoir computer during the au-
tonomous run is given by Eqs. 1, 2, 5 supplemented by
d(n) = y(n) (during autonomous run). (7)
The reservoir now uses its estimates of the previous
points in the time series to estimate the next point.
III. TRAINING ON THE MACKEY-GLASS
AND LORENZ SYSTEMS
For illustrative purposes in this work, we use the one-
dimensional Mackey-Glass (MG) delay equation and the
tri-dimensional Lorenz system. The prediction of the MG
and Lorenz systems time series using echo state networks
and variants thereof has been investigated previously in
a number of works, see [1–5, 43, 44].
The Mackey-Glass delay differential equation
dx
dt
= β
x(t− τ)
1 + xn(t− τ) − γx, (8)
with τ , γ, β, n > 0 was introduced to illustrate the ap-
pearance of complex dynamics in physiological control
systems [27]. To obtain chaotic dynamics, we set the pa-
rameters as in [1]: β = 0.2, γ = 0.1, τ = 17 and n = 10.
With these settings, the highest Lyapunov exponent is
λ = 0.006 [1].
Eq. 8 was integrated using Matlab’s dde23 solver with
the initial condition x(t ≤ 0) = 0.5 and integration step
of 0.5 for 7000 timesteps. The first 1000 transient values
were discarded and the remaining data was split into 3000
training and 3000 test inputs.
For the MG task, we used a reservoir with N = 1500
neurons, the matrix W was rescaled to a spectral radius
of 0.79, while the vectors win, wback were not rescaled,
and we set ∆ = 1, C = 0.44, a = 0.9.
At the training stage we obtained an error of NMSE =
3 × 10−9. During the free run, the error gradually in-
creases, as the reservoir output signal slowly deviates
from the target trajectory on the Mackey-Glass attractor.
Nevertheless, the system manages to generate the desired
output for several hundreds of timesteps with reasonable
precision.
The Lorenz equations, a system of three ordinary dif-
ferential equations
dx
dt
= σ (y − x) , (9a)
dy
dt
= −xz + rx− y, (9b)
dz
dt
= xy − bz, (9c)
with σ, r, b > 0, was introduced as a simple model for
atmospheric convection [26]. The system exhibits chaotic
behaviour for σ = 10, b = 8/3 and r = 28 [45], that we
used in this study. This yields a chaotic attractor with
the highest Lyapunov exponent of λ = 0.906 [1].
The Lorenz Eqs. 9 were integrated using Matlab’s
ode45 routine with an integration step of 0.02 for 10000
timesteps. We only used the x coordinate of the chaotic
system, which was rescaled by the factor of 0.01, as in
[1]. The first 1000 transient values were discarded and
the remaining data was split into 6000 training and 3000
test inputs.
For the Lorenz task, we used a reservoir of size N =
1500. We set the spectral radius of the weight matrix W
to 0.97, the input and feedback weights win and wback
were rescaled to the interval [−0.5, 0.5], and we set ∆ =
1, C = 0.44 and a = 0.9. To obtain better results we
used a form of ridge regression for this task, namely we
added noise drawn from the uniform distribution over
[−10−6, 10−6] in the argument of the tanh in Eq. 1.
We obtained a training error of NMSE = 3 × 10−8.
The error is one order of magnitude higher here than
in the Mackey-Glass case. This may be due to the fact
that the Lorenz system has a higher positive Lyapunov
exponent and thus exhibits stronger chaoticity than the
Mackey-Glass system, and/or to the fact that the reser-
voir computer is expected to emulate the dynamics of a
3-dimensional system given only one dimension (the x
coordinate), which is more challenging than the recon-
struction of the scalar Mackey-Glass system.
Note: We use here the traditional notation for echo
state networks, MG and Lorenz systems, which means
that different meanings are given to the same letters.
4When it is not clear from the context, we use a subscript
xRC , xMG, xL to differentiate them.
IV. SYNCHRONISING TRAINED RESERVOIR
COMPUTERS WITH THE MACKEY-GLASS
AND LORENZ SYSTEMS
Let s(n) be the time series of the chaotic system with
which one wishes to synchronise, with n the discretised
time used to integrate the Eqs. 8, 9. We first train the
reservoir to predict the next sample in the time series,
as described above. Next we start an autonomous run
in which the reservoir follows its own dynamics, given by
Eqs. 1, 2, 7. At time n = n0, we start weakly driving
the reservoir with the chaotic time series s(n). That is,
its dynamics is given by Eqs. 1, 2, supplemented by
d(n) = (1− q)y(n) + qs(n) (when locked). (10)
with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the trained reservoir
can lock onto the MG and Lorenz systems. It should be
noted that during the synchronisation phase, the NMSE
decreases until a minimum value and then stays constant.
On the other hand, if we were to synchronise two identical
MG or Lorenz systems, the NMSE would decrease until
it reached the machine precision. The difference arises
because the trained reservoir does not exactly reproduce
the dynamics of the MG or Lorenz system.
Taking q = 0.25, we obtained synchronisation errors of
NMSEMG-RC = 1.5×10−4 and NMSELZ-RC = 2.3×10−7.
Note that the first subscript corresponds to the primary
system, and the seconds indicates the secondary system
that is being driven by the primary. Results for other
values of q are given in the last panels of Figs. 1 and 2.
We also tested the inverse scenario, in which a chaotic
system (MG or Lorenz) is synchronised on a trained
reservoir computer. Let yRC be the output of the trained
reservoir. In the case of MG, we let Eq. 8 evolve au-
tonomously until t = 500. At this time, we change the
right hand side of Eq. 8, replacing x(t) by
x(t)→ qyRC(t) + (1− q)x(t). (11)
In the case of Lorenz, we let the Eqs. 9 evolve au-
tonomously until t = 20, when we change the right
hand side of Eqs. 9, replacing x(t) by Eq. 11. In
both cases we took q = 0.25. The results are plot-
ted in Fig. 3. We obtained synchronisation errors of
NMSERC-MG = 1.5×10−3 and NMSERC-LZ = 1.5×10−1.
Note that the NMSEs are higher than when the RC syn-
chronises onto the MG or LZ systems. This may be due
to the fact that the reservoir produces outputs at dis-
crete times separated by the sampling rate ∆, and that
this induces a form of noise on the driving signal. We did
not investigate in detail the origin of this difference.
V. CHAOS-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Chaos-based cryptography is based on the two ideas
that (1) the unpredictable nature of chaotic systems can
be used to mask a message and (2) that chaos synchro-
nisation can be used by the receiver to faithfully recover
the message. Unfortunately this nice idea has not sur-
vived systematic cryptanalysis, basically because the key
space (i.e. the parameters describing the chaotic system)
is too small, and efficient search methods to recover the
key can be developed, see [41] and references therein.
The fact that reservoir computers can be trained to
emulate chaotic systems, to the extent that the trained
reservoir will synchronise with the original chaotic system
(as demonstrated in the previous section) suggests that
reservoir computing could form the basis for an alterna-
tive, conceptually different, approach to cracking chaos
based cryptography.
Here, we demonstrate this on a specific example of how
a reservoir computer can be used to crack a chaos based
cryptosystem. We then give some heuristic arguments
on why reservoir based approaches could systematically
crack chaos based cryptography. For definiteness, we fo-
cus on a scheme previously studied in [40] and referred to
as the III/1 scheme. This scheme is of interest, because
it is similar to many of the systems used in experimental
chaos based cryptography that often use delay dynami-
cal systems as chaotic systems, see e.g. [32, 33]. It has
already been cracked in [40], using time-delay system re-
construction method to recover the unknown parameters
of the transmitter. In this work, we use a reservoir com-
puter as an alternative approach. Its advantage over the
method in [40] is that the knowledge of the governing
equation of the transmitter (see Eq. 12 below) is not
required.
We recall the scheme III/1 of [40], wherein Alice and
Bob exchange secret messages, while Eve is eavesdrop-
ping. To encode her message, Alice uses a delay dynam-
ical system in which she injects her message m(t). Her
dynamical system obeys the equation
x˙(t) = −x(t) + f [x(t− τ)] +m(t), (12)
where τ is the delay and  characterises the inertial prop-
erties of the system. Alice sends x(t) to Bob.
We suppose that x(t) is subject to noise during trans-
mission, so that what is received by Bob is
x′(t) = x(t) + ν(t) (13)
where ν(t) is white noise whose amplitude is given below
(i.e. for each successive time point t, ν(t) is indepen-
dently drawn from the uniform distribution over [−ν, ν]).
To decrypt the message, Bob uses the same delay sys-
tem, but in an open loop configuration to obtain the
variable y(t) given by
y˙(t) = −y(t) + f [x′(t− τ)] . (14)
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FIG. 1. Synchronisation of a trained reservoir computer on the Mackey-Glass system, integrated from the initial condition
xMG(t ≤ 0) = 0.2. The reservoir computer is trained from t = −3000 to t = 0, whereupon it become autonomous until t = 500.
At t = 500, we set the coupling to q = 0.25 and remove it (q = 0) at t = 1500. Plot (a) depicts only the region of interest around
t = 500, where the reservoir (solid line) synchronises with the chaotic system (dotted line). Plot (b) shows the evolution of
the NMSE, averaged over 100-timestep intervals, for the entire duration of the simulation, showing the decrease of the NMSE
when the synchronisation is turned on, the saturation of the NMSE to a low value (NMSE = 1.5× 10−4) after synchronisation,
and the increase of the NMSE when the synchronisation is turned back off. Plot (c) illustrates the same scenario with different
coupling strengths. For q = 0.5, the synchronisation is quicker, as can be seen from the steeper slope, and the resulting NMSE
is lower (NMSE = 7.1× 10−6). Lower values of q lead to slower synchronisation, with a higher error. At q = 0.001, the systems
no longer synchronise.
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FIG. 2. Synchronisation of a trained reservoir computer on the Lorenz system, integrated from (x0, y0, z0)LZ = (10, 0, 0).
The reservoir computer is trained from t = −3000 to t = 0, whereupon it become autonomous until t = 20. At t = 20, we
set the coupling to q = 0.25 and remove it (q = 0) at t = 80. Plot (a) depicts only the region of interest around t = 20,
where the reservoir (solid line) synchronises with the chaotic system (dotted line). Plot (b) shows the evolution of the NMSE,
averaged over 100-timestep intervals, for the entire duration of the simulation, showing the decrease of the NMSE when the
synchronisation is turned on, the saturation of the NMSE to a low value (NMSE = 2.3× 10−7) after synchronisation, and the
increase of the NMSE when the synchronisation is turned back off. Plot (c) illustrates the same scenario with different coupling
strengths. Again, higher coupling (q = 0.5) leads to a lower synchronisation error (NMSE = 5.1× 10−8). Decreasing q leads to
a system that tries to synchronise but fails (q = 0.1). At q = 0.05, the systems do not synchronise at all.
Then, Bob computes
z′(t) = x′(t)− y(t) (15)
and obtains an approximate message m′(t) as follows
m′(t) = z˙′(t) + z′(t). (16)
This allows Bob to recover the message m(t), typically
corrupted by some high frequency noise. Passing m′(t)
through a passband filter centred on the frequency band
occupied by m(t) allows Bob to recover a good approxi-
mation of m(t).
In order to crack this system, we suppose that Eve has
access to a plain text attack, i.e. she has access to both
x′(t) and m(t) during some time interval. Thus, she can
train her reservoir computer to produce m(t) given x′(t)
as input. To this end she uses the scheme described in
section II B, in which the input to the reservoir u(t) is
taken to be the signal x′(t) sent by Alice to Bob, and the
output of the reservoir (y(t) in Eq. 3) is trained to be as
close as possible to m(t).
To illustrate this, we used the MG system Eq. 8 with
the same parameters used elsewhere in this work (β =
60.4
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FIG. 3. Inverse scenario: synchronisation of (a) Mackey-Glass and (b) Lorenz chaotic systems on a trained reservoir computer.
The left panel depicts the region of interest around t = 500, where the Mackey-Glass system (solid lines) synchronises onto the
reservoir computer (dotted lines). The synchronisation is quite efficient in this case. For the Lorenz system, a close view of the
region of interest around t = 20 does not show any interesting dynamics, since the synchronisation error stays quite significant.
For this reason, we plot the full time trace instead (right panel) that shows that the synchronised Lorenz system (solid line)
accurately follows the switches between the lobes of the Lorenz attractor, emulated by the reservoir computer (dotted lines).
The resulting error is much higher in this experiment, but the synchronisation phenomenon can still be observed. At t = 40
we stopped the synchronisation (q = 0) and the two systems immediately desynchronised.
0.2, γ = 0.1, τ = 17 and n = 10) (which are identical to
the parameters used in [40] except for τ).
We first investigate the case where the message is a
frequency-modulated harmonic signal of the form
m(t) = A sin [2pifct−B cos(2pifmt)] , (17)
where fc = 5×10−3 is the central frequency of the power
spectrum of the signal, B = 3 is the frequency modula-
tion index, fm = 5 × 10−5 is the modulation frequency
and A = 0.01 is the amplitude of the message, chosen
to ensure that the information signal comprises 1% of
the amplitude of the chaotic carrier. The message and
the values of the parameters are identical to those used
in [40]. We take the amplitude of the noise ν(t) to be
ν = 10−1A where A is the maximum amplitude of the
message m(t), corresponding to a SNR of 1.5× 105.
To crack the system, Eve used a reservoir computer
with N = 250 internal nodes and trained on a plain text
message comprising 12000 timesteps. The spectral ra-
dius of the weight matrix W was set to 0.79, the input
weights win were rescaled with a global coefficient of 0.9,
the feedback was switched off wback = 0, and we set
∆ = 0.5, C = 0.05 and a = 0.9. We obtained a training
error of NMSE = 3.8× 10−2.
Using this trained RC, Eve can now try to recover an
unknown message sent by Alice. The results are pre-
sented in Fig. 4 (temporal signals) and Fig. 5 (frequency
spectra), where we compare decryption by Bob and Eve.
Bob manages to accurately retrieve the frequency modu-
lation, but his result is corrupted by high-frequency noise.
Therefore, his receiver would benefit from a low-pass fil-
ter to get rid of this noise. Eve’s reservoir, on the other
hand, incorporates a band-pass filter (the coefficients a
and C in Eq. 1) that was adjusted to match the frequency
band of the message sent by Alice. As a consequence Eve
obtains a much cleaner signal. Note that there remain
some amplitude variations of Eve’s output signal, which
may be due to the passband ripples of the low-pass filter
of the reservoir computer. However, these ripples do not
hinder the retrieval of the frequency modulation. Note
that if we set the noise during communication ν to zero,
then Bob’s message is of higher quality than Eve’s (fig-
ures not shown), which is expected since in this case Bob
is carrying out exactly the inverse operation as Alice.
We next investigate a more realistic scenario in which
frequency modulation of the sine wave is used to transmit
a stream of bits b(k) (with k ∈ Z) by assigning a higher
frequency ω1 for a “1” and a lower ω0 for a “0”. In this
case, the expression of the encoded message (Eq. 17)
becomes
m(t) = A sin
[
ωb(k)t
]
, t ∈ [kT, k(T + 1)[ , (18)
where T = 2pi/ω0 is the duration of one bit. We take
A = 0.02, ω0 = 0.02pi and ω1 = 0.04pi. These frequen-
cies are chosen so that the message spectrum is centred
on the frequencies where the Mackey-Glass system has
largest spectral amplitude, making the system, in prin-
ciple, harder to crack than the previous example. The
amplitude of the noise during transmission is taken to be
ν = 10−1A, corresponding to a SNR of 3.8× 104.
Eve uses a reservoir computer with N = 250 internal
nodes and trained on a plain text message comprising
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FIG. 4. Temporal signals obtained during encryption and decryption of the frequency-modulated sine message Eq. 17. (a)
Encrypted signal x(t) (chaotic carrier + low-amplitude message, solid line) sent by Alice to Bob. The message m(t) (dotted
line) is plotted for scale. Note that a small amount of white noise is added to the message during transmission. (b) Message
decrypted by Bob (grey) compared to the original message (black). Despite the high-frequency noise, Bob accurately recovers
the frequency modulation of the sine wave. (c) Message obtained by Eve (black) using a trained reservoir computer. Despite
slight amplitude variations of the recovered message, Eve accurately recovers the frequency modulation (grey), and with less
high-frequency noise than Bob.
7000 timesteps. The spectral radius of the weight ma-
trix W was set to 0.79, the input weights win were not
rescaled, the feedback was switched off wback = 0, and
we set ∆ = 0.1, C = 0.22 and a = 0.9. We obtained a
training error of NMSE = 2× 10−1.
Figure 6 displays the original message (black) and the
signal obtained by Eve, using a reservoir computer (grey).
Although the recovered signal is not perfect, with signifi-
cant distortion and noise, one can still accurately recover
the encrypted bit message.
VI. DISCUSSION: WHY CAN RESERVOIR
COMPUTERS EMULATE CHAOTIC
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND CRACK CHAOS
BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY ?
The works [1–5] and the present results show that
reservoir computers can be trained to emulate chaotic
dynamical systems. Here we try to sketch why this is
possible.
The key theoretical concept to understand reservoir
computers seems to be the notion of fading memory
function [46], see [12–15]. Consider a time series u(n)
with n integer. We denote by u−∞(n) = (u(n), u(n −
1), u(n − 2), ...) the set of all values up to and includ-
ing time n. Consider a real valued function acting on
this left infinite time series F [u−∞(n)]. It has the fading
memory property if F depends less and less on u(n) as
n→ −∞. More precisely, if there is a family of functions
Fm[u(n), u(n − 1), ..., u(n − m)] such that Fm → F as
m→∞, i.e. we can approximate F by functions of only
the last m terms in the time series.
If a reservoir computer obeying the echo state property
is driven by a time series u(n), then its internal variables
xi(n) are fading memory functions of the input time se-
ries xi(n) = Xi[u
−∞(n)], and hence the output y(n) of
the reservoir computer is also a fading memory function.
In [15] it was shown that there exists a variant of reser-
voir computer (based on a polynomial recurrence) that
has the following universality property: as the size of
the reservoir grows, it can approximate any fading mem-
ory function to arbitrary accuracy. This universality
property may also hold for reservoirs of the form Eq.
1, although this has not been proven. Assuming this
hypothesis to be true, given a fading memory function
F [u−∞(n)], a reservoir computer can approximate F to
arbitrary accuracy. That is, the reservoir implements a
function y(n) = F ′[u−∞(n)] which is arbitrarily close to
F , |F ′ − F | ≤  (for an appropriate metric on the space
of fading memory functions), where  can be made ar-
bitrarily small by taking the number of variables of the
reservoir N sufficiently large.
Chaotic dynamical systems are also closely linked to
the fading memory property. Indeed many chaotic dy-
namical systems can be expressed as a recurrence of the
form
d(n) = D[d−∞(n− 1)], (19)
where D has the fading memory property. This is obvi-
ously the case for the logistic map, or for the Mackey-
Glass system (upon discretising the time variable), and
probably is also true for the Lorenz system (although we
have not proven it).
Therefore, if a reservoir computer is driven by such a
chaotic time series d(n), it can learn an arbitrarily good
approximation D′ of the chaotic recurrence. Upon clos-
ing the reservoir upon itself, it will obey the recurrence
d(n) = D′[d−∞(n− 1)], (20)
with |D′−D| ≤ δ, where δ can be made arbitrarily small
by taking the number of variables of the reservoir N suf-
ficiently large. One can thus expect that many properties
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FIG. 5. Frequency spectra of signals obtained during encryption and decryption of the frequency-modulated sine message
Eq. 17. (a) Mackey-Glass signal x(t). (b) Zoom on the part of the spectrum of the Mackey-Glass signal x(t) which overlaps
with the spectrum of the message (the frequency-modulated sine Eq. 17, highlighted for clarity). Note that the message is well
hidden by the chaotic signal x(t). (c) Message decrypted by Bob: the frequency modulation is recovered accurately, while the
right-hand side of the spectrum (flat, non-zero) corresponds to the high-frequency noise, observed in Fig. 4(b). (d) Message
cracked by Eve: the frequency modulation has been recovered accurately, with a lower level of high-frequency noise.
of the original dynamical system will be inherited by the
reservoir’s emulation. This is confirmed by the numerical
studies carried out so far. The above suggests that this
could be extended to a formal proof.
We now turn to chaos cryptography. In such a system,
Alice sends Bob a times series s(n) in which her message
m(n) is hidden. In most such cryptography systems, if
not all, Bob’s decoding operation will consist of passing
the time series s(n) through a fading memory function
M ′ to obtain an approximation m′(n) of the original mes-
sage m′(n) = M ′[s−∞(n)] where |m′ −m| < η for some
metric on time series. The fading memory nature of the
decoder seems necessary, as it implies that the decoder
can act locally on the time series, and does not depend on
the values of the time series arbitrarily far in the past.
Furthermore, in experimental implementations, the de-
coding operation must be robust to imperfections. That
is, if M ′′ is another fading memory function that is suf-
ficiently close to M ′ (i.e. |M ′′ −M ′| < ρ), then the cor-
responding decoded message m′′(n) = M ′′[s−∞(n)] will
also be close to the original message if ρ is sufficiently
small.
But this means that given a plain text attack in which
the eavesdropper knows the time series s(n) and the cor-
responding message m(n), she can train a reservoir com-
puter to approximate the fading memory function M ′.
Given the above-mentioned necessary robustness of the
cryptographic scheme, if Eve’s approximation is good
enough, her trained reservoir will now be able to recover
the unknown messages.
The above arguments show the plausibility of reser-
voir computers being able to emulate chaotic systems
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and to crack chaos-based cryptography. These argu-
ments however say nothing about the efficiency of this
approach. Numerical investigations so far suggest that
reservoir computers are remarkably good at such emu-
lation tasks. Presumably this is because the reservoir
computing approach generates fading memory functions
Xi which are in some sense close to the kind of functions
produced by natural systems. But of course any other
approach that can generate a dense set of fading mem-
ory functions (such as, for instance, Volterra series) will
also work, although possibly less efficiently.
VII. CONCLUSION
Time series forecasting has been investigated with sev-
eral different machine learning techniques, in addition to
reservoir computing. These include support vector ma-
chines [47, 48], and auto regressive models and neural
networks [49]. It would of course be very interesting to
compare reservoir computing with other machine learn-
ing approaches for the above tasks of emulating chaotic
systems, learning their parameters, chaos synchronisa-
tion, cracking chaos cryptography, etc... Such a compar-
ison goes however beyond the present work. We expect
that reservoir computing will probably report favourably
in such a comparison. Indeed as noted above to the best
of our knowledge reservoir computers hold the record
for predicting the future trajectory of chaotic systems.
(Most likely this is because reservoir computers, being
recurrent dynamical systems themselves, already encode
much of the structure which needed for such a task). An
advantage of reservoir computers is that they are partic-
ularly easy to train, using only a linear regression.
The present work builds on previous works which
showed that reservoir computers with output feedback
can emulate chaotic dynamical systems. Previous works
focused on forecasting trajectories [1, 15] and predict-
ing spatio-temporal chaos [5] , inferring hidden degrees
of freedom [3], estimating Lyapunov exponents[4]. Here
we show that trained reservoir computers can synchro-
nise with another chaotic system, thereby demonstrating
that the trained reservoir computer has an attractor with
similar geometry and stability properties as the original
system. We then show how a reservoir computer can be
used to crack chaos based cryptography.
It is interesting to note that cracking chaos based cryp-
tography seems comparatively easy for the reservoir com-
puter. Indeed, while for the time series prediction task
(Sec. III) we used reservoirs with N = 1500 neurons, for
the cryptography application we only used N = 250 neu-
rons. In addition in the presence of noise in the transmis-
sion line the reservoir computer in fact performed better
than the system used by Bob. This is in part because the
reservoir computer we used comprises a low pass filter.
As noted above, reservoir computers can be imple-
mented in hardware implementations, with good per-
formance and high speed [19–21]. The present numeri-
cal results suggest that such experimental systems would
be good candidates for cracking physically implemented
chaos cryptography.
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